Belonging, individuality, and creative freedom
Composers form a guild of tricksters with an extensive repertoire of commonplaces and memorized phrases. These do not require any kind of intelligent content to be highly effective in the art of deceiving journalists, supporters, and above all, ourselves, into the illusion that we have something interesting to say or be. One of these tricks is the notion that the purpose of creation is not so much to respond to the dilemma of innovation but “to be oneself”, a comfortable and complacent slogan. This idea does not generate conflict with any of the extremes of the progressive-conservative aesthetic spectrum, a spectrum that we still seem unable to avoid. Supposedly avant-garde creators can identify their desire to explore uncharted territories with the impulse to delve into themselves. On the other hand, creators of a more conservative nature articulate their discourse as that very impulse to be themselves, in an exercise of positioning against a supposed tyranny of innovation.
The problem with these approaches lies not in their incapacity to answer the question of the meaning of musical creation but in the fact that “being oneself” doesn’t mean anything at all. The expression seems to insinuate that invoking this capacity for individualization is a guarantee of freedom. It suggests that freedom consists of getting rid of external and explicit conditioning, so that once isolated from all influences, we can remove the veil that prevented us from knowing who we are and what we want. However, the exercise of choosing freely has more to do with understanding what we belong to than with detaching ourselves from it. Composers tend to fall into the fantasy of mystifying a heroic individuality, but the truth is that we live in the world, our listening has been shaped by it, and the deliberate exercise of understanding our relationship with our culture is the tool that can enable us to have a minimally unique voice.
These considerations about creative freedom have clear correlations with different conceptions of political freedom. The popularization of the concept of individualism associated with the creative act would be hard to imagine without certain economic and political contexts in which we can pose the same opposition mentioned earlier. The libertarian neoliberal concept considers citizens to be free when they are not subject to regulation, believing that the less they are subjected to laws and the smaller the presence of the state, the easier it is for them to know what they want and make the right decisions. On the other hand, contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the left does not despise the concept of individual freedom but conceives it as the need to not be excluded from public activity and the absence of not only explicit but also structural dominations. For example, a low-income family can live in a political system that allows them to choose the type of education for their children, but that freedom of choice has no real effectiveness if they do not have the means to afford the various schooling options. The ability for citizens to choose freely is often much more complex than just being permitted by law. Similarly, a composer may proclaim that they are not influenced by any trends and that they make their own decisions. In their naivety, they call opposing tendencies as passing fashions while ignoring those that are more akin to them and are a part of their own identity. As long as they are not aware of the systems in which they live, think, and listen, they are completely subjected to them, no matter how much they insist on their individuality.
It is worth mentioning the archetype of the composer who, in their maturity, makes their style more consonant, accompanying it with the discourse of having managed to get rid of a certain tyranny that did not allow them to be themselves, and now dares to make simpler music (the praise of a simplicity that is also sophisticated often accompanies these discourses; it remains to be seen if their music reflects the same). I find it appropriate to defend fellow composers who have experienced situations in which coercion has been exercised not only subliminally but explicitly on their way of making music. This imposition is often exercised, by the way, by other colleagues who may be less progressive than they like to proclaim, which is likely the reason for their need to position themselves as the official inquisitors of the Avant-Gardes™. However, it is insufficient to consider explicit constraints from the environment as the only impediment to creative freedom. Overcoming them may be a necessary condition but not sufficient, and in many cases, implicit structural elements can have a much greater influence on the decisions we make. It is also important to be wary of the somewhat deceptive insinuation made by that discourse, suggesting that others who continue to seek disruptive music do so as an expression of submission to a predominant trend, as if positioning oneself in relation to the implications of each period code and what to do with it did not involve numerous considerations and diverse motivations.
One final note: it is wise to be cautious about the reductionism of considering everything we are a part of and that determines us as a threat to freedom. The listening codes that govern the musical culture in which we live are not mere constraints that limit our creative capacity: they are also the tools that make it possible. Just as a writer uses language as a means to articulate their ideas, even though that language frames what can be said and how it can be expressed, musical creation is also possible thanks to the underlying codes that are simultaneously its own limit. Creative freedom has much more to do with becoming aware of everything that shapes and determines who we are than with the impossibility of trying to do away with those elements.
30.5.2023